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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Obama Administration announced its conservation 
plans for the greater sage-grouse, an iconic bird of the intermountain west.1 
Political leadership at the time described those plans as the “largest 
________ 
*  Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
This Article draws on work in which I engaged as the Deputy Solicitor for Land 
Resources at the U.S. Department of the Interior during the Obama Administration. 
During my time serving in that capacity, I played a role in negotiating and reviewing 
the Newmont Agreement discussed in this article. I would like to thank the many 
tremendous civil servants at the Department of the Interior with whom I had the 
privilege of working on this and other matters. 
1.  See Fact Sheet: BLM, USFS Greater Sage-Grouse Conservation 
Effort, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/ 
files/BLM%20USFS%20Greater%20Sage%20Grouse%20Conservation%20Effort%
20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.  
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landscape-level conservation effort in U.S. history,”2 and they served as 
the foundation for a decision by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”) that a listing of the bird was not warranted under the Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”).3 
The Trump Administration appears poised to substantially amend 
the plans,4 although an array of interested parties have urged that the plans 
be left intact.5 Regardless of the outcome of this debate, conservation of 
the greater sage-grouse exemplifies persistent controversies about federal 
protections for declining species and the effects such protections may have 
on property owners and economic actors. The ESA has a been a perennial 
bête noire for many western state republicans. Earlier this year, 
Congressman Rob Bishop, the chairman of the House Resources 
Committee, stated: “[T]he ESA doesn’t work . . . . We have to find a way 
to reform it so that it actually solves problems, not just continues on the 
process.”6 The specter of listing the greater sage-grouse in particular has 
been of concern; in 2004, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton worried 
that the greater sage-grouse could become the “spotted owl of the 
________ 
2.  Christy Goldfuss et al., Press Release, Unprecedented 
Collaboration to Save Sage-Grouse is the Largest Wildlife Conservation Effort in 
U.S., (Sept. 22, 2015), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015
/09/22/ unprecedented-collaboration-save-sage-grouse-largest-wildlife-conservation-
effort-us. 
3.   Id. 
4.   See Notice of Intent to Amend Land Use Plans Regarding Greater 
Sage-Grouse Conservation and Prepare Associated Environmental Impact Statements 
or Environmental Assessments, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,248 (Oct. 11, 2017); corrected by 82 
Fed. Reg. 50,666 (Nov. 1, 2017). 
5.  See Letter from Paul Ulrich et al., to Erica Husse Nov. 30, 2017 
(expressing concerns of Wyoming ranching, mining, and conservation organizations), 
available at https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/12/01/document_gw_03.pdf.   
6.  Timothy Cama & Devin Henry, Overnight Energy: GOP moves to 
reform Endangered Species Act, THE HILL (July 19, 2017, 06:06 PM EDT) 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/overnights/342815-overnight-energy-
gop-takes-on-endangered-species-reform. 
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Intermountain West,”7 invoking the species whose listing is often blamed 
for the so-called “timber wars” in the northwestern United States.8  
Notwithstanding the sustained assault on the ESA from some 
sectors, the FWS has engaged in numerous regulatory reforms over the 
years to minimize the disruption a listing may have to economic activities 
and to produce better outcomes for imperiled species.9 These efforts have 
facilitated collaboration among stakeholders, including states and local 
governments, developers, resource users, and conservation organizations, 
and have encouraged voluntary, affirmative conservation efforts in 
exchange for increased regulatory predictability.10  
This article situates greater sage-grouse conservation within the 
context of ongoing efforts at the FWS, and Department of the Interior 
generally, to develop approaches to simultaneously enhance ecological 
certainty for species and economic certainty for businesses. As a recent 
illustration of these efforts, it focuses on two unique public-private 
conservation agreements signed shortly before the end of the Obama 
Administration between mining companies and the federal government. 
Under those agreements, the companies committed to engaging in greater 
sage-grouse conservation efforts in exchange for more certainty about 
their obligations to mitigate the negative environmental effects of 
activities they carry out on public lands to extract federal mineral 
________ 
7.   Endangered Species II: Western officials blast ESA, GREEN WIRE 
(June 24, 2004) available at https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/24605; see 
Amanda R. Garcia, Note, The Sage Grouse Debate: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the 
Discourse of the Endangered Species Act, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 572, 575–76 (2006). 
8.   See Laura J. Hendrickson, Coverage of the Endangered Species 
Act in Four Major Newspapers, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 135, 136 (2005); See also 
Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations 
Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 478–79  (1997). 
9.   See J.B. Ruhl, Past, Present, and Future Trends of the Endangered 
Species Act, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 15, 33-34 (2004). 
10.   See, e.g., Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the 
Endangered Species Act’s Best Availabile Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 403 
(2004) (noting the development of candidate conservation agreements to secure 
“specific conservation measures for the benefit of candidate species in return for 
assurances that [propery owners] will not be subject to additional regulatory 
restrictions should the species be listed in the future”). 
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resources. Barrick Gold of North America (“Barrick”) entered into an 
agreement—titled the “Barrick Nevada Sage-Grouse Bank Enabling 
Agreement”—with the BLM and the FWS on March 25, 2015 (the 
“Barrick Agreement”).11 Newmont Mining Corporation entered into an 
agreement—titled a “Conservation Framework Agreement”—with the 
BLM, the FWS, and the State of Nevada on August 30, 2016 (the 
“Newmont Agreement”).12 While these agreements resemble other 
approaches to secure conservation commitments in exchange for 
regulatory certainty, they appear to be the first agreements under which 
federal land management agencies have relied on their land use planning 
authority to enter into agreements with private resource users that provide 
a framework for mitigating the impacts of future land use approvals to a 
sensitive but unlisted species.13 These agreements suggest potentially 
fruitful opportunities for future collaboration and experimentation among 
federal government agencies, state agencies, and resource users with the 
goal of enhancing economic and ecological certainty.  
________ 
11.   Barrick Nevada Sage-Grouse Bank Enabling Agreement, by and 
among the U.S. Dept’t of the Interior and Barrick Gold of North America (Mar. 25, 
2015) (hereinafter Barrick Agreement), available at http://www.eswr.com/docs/gsg/
DOI-Barrick%20Sage%20Grouse%20Agreement%20March2015.pdf. 
12.   Conservation Framework Agreement, by and among U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior, State of Nevada, and Newmont Mining Corp. (Aug. 30, 2016) (hereinafter 
Newmont Agreement), available at http://sagebrusheco.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/ 
sagebrusheconvgov/content/Meetings/2016/160913-ConsrevationAgreement-
Item6.pdf.  
13.   These agreements most closely resemble candidate conservation 
agreements, through which a private party agrees to engage in affirmative 
conservation activites for a non-listed species in exchange for a promise that they will 
face no further obligations if the species is listed.  See Safe Harbor Agreements and 
Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726, 32,727 
(June 17, 1999). Those agreements, however, are designed to address the fact that: 
Much of the land containing the nation's existing and potential fish and wildlife 
habitat is owned by private citizens, States, local governments, Native American 
Tribal governments, businesses, organizations, and other non-Federal 
entities.The future of many declining species is dependent, wholly or in part, on 
conservation efforts on these non-Federal landsgenerally between FWS and 
private parties and do not involve a the land use approvals of a federal land 
management agency.  
Id.  The Newmont and Barrick Agreements, on the other hand, address private 
activities on federal land, and necessarily involve the federal land management 
agencies, rather than only FWS. 
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To explore the Agreements and their import, this Article proceeds 
in five parts. Part II provides an overview of the protections the ESA 
affords to imperiled species. While the greater sage-grouse remains 
unlisted, the potential for listing, and the regulatory consequences 
attendant to such an action, created a convergence of interests that led to 
the greater sage-grouse conservation plans and the Barrick and Newmont 
Agreements. Part III discusses the ecological and economic uncertainty 
that adheres to wildlife conservation under the ESA. Part IV provides a 
general overview of greater sage-grouse conservation efforts undertaken 
during the Obama Administration. And Part V addresses the Barrick and 
Newmont Agreements specifically, examining their features and offering 
thoughts about the lessons that can be gleaned for future conservation 
agreements between public and private actors. Finally, the conclusion and 
epilogue discusses the Trump Administration’s current review of the 
greater sage-grouse plans, and the unlikely assortment of interests who 
have joined together to urge the Administration to avoid major changes 
that could create significant long-term regulatory uncertainty for resource 
users and lead to further declines in the population of greater sage-grouse.  
 
II.  FEDERAL WILDLIFE CONSERVATION UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
This section describes the major provisions of the ESA that serve 
as the backdrop for conservation of the greater sage-grouse. While the bird 
remains unlisted, the regulatory and other conservation efforts of federal 
land management agencies, local and state governments, and private 
entities has occurred in part to avoid a listing, and a future decision to list 
the bird remains a significant concern for resource users across sagebrush 
country.  
The management and conservation of fish and wildlife within the 
United States largely falls to the states.14 Such management and 
________ 
14.   See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976) (“[T]he 
States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their 
jurisdiction.”). While Congress may preempt state wildlife law on federal lands, it has 
generally not done so. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1248 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980).  
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conservation occurs, however, in the shadow of the federal ESA, which 
imposes robust protections for species if listed as either threatened or 
endangered.15  This regulatory precipice can create fertile ground for 
collaboration among the many parties—businesses, non-profit 
organizations, tribes, state and federal agencies, and non-profit 
organizations—who would prefer that a species remain viable without the 
need for a listing decision.16 The Department of the Interior, through the 
FWS, generally implements the protections the ESA affords to terrestrial 
and freshwater aquatic species.17 
The ESA stands out among modern federal environmental and 
natural resources laws. For one thing, it is remarkably short and clear.18 In 
just twenty-one pages, the sixteen original sections of the Act established 
“one of the world’s most powerful species preservation laws.”19 While a 
few subsequent amendments have added marginally to its length and 
complexity, the framework Congress created in 1973 to insure the survival 
of threatened and endangered species persists today. Another 
distinguishing feature of the Act is its uncompromising approach. Unlike 
other modern environmental laws that generally require some balancing 
of interests, the original provisions of the ESA brokered no compromise:20 
the federal government was absolutely barred from engaging in any action 
________ 
15.   See J. Peter Byrne, Precipice Regulations and Perverse 
Incentives: Comparing Historic Preservation Designation and Endangered Species 
Listing, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 345–46 (2015). 
16.   Peter Byrne has explored the perverse incentives that can be 
created by regulatory precipices such as listing under the ESA. Id. at 346. Regulatory 
precipice, at least in the context of a listing decision under the ESA, may also have the 
salutary effect of creating significant incentives for stakeholders to engage in 
affirmative, proactive conservation to improve the health of a declining species and 
avoid a listing. That incentive, however, will only materialize if stakeholders believe 
that their efforts can persuade the FWS that a listing is unnecessary.  
17.   16 U.S.C. § 1532(15); see Federico Cheever, The Road to 
Recovery: A New Way of Thinking about the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOL. L.Q. 
1, 6 n.16 (1996). The Department of Commerce, through the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, generally implements the ESA for marine and anadromous species. 
Id. 
18.   See Cheever, supra note 15, at 5. 
19.   Id.; see Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 
884-904 (Dec. 28, 1973). 
20.   RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 73 
(2004). 
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jeopardizing a listed species and everyone faced civil and even criminal 
penalties if they harmed an individual member of an endangered species.21 
The ESA establishes its primary requirements in five sections. 
Section 4 governs the listing of a species as either endangered—meaning 
that it “is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of 
its range”—22or threatened—meaning that it is “likely to become an 
endangered species within the foreseeable future.”23 The FWS must 
determine whether a species qualifies as endangered or threatened based 
on the “best scientific and commercial data available.”24 In making that 
determination, the FWS must account for direct and indirect threats to the 
species, including “the present or threatened destruction, modification, or 
curtailment of its habitat or range,” and “the inadequacy of existing 
regulatory mechanisms” that protect the species in the absence of a listing 
decision.25 Listing a species occurs through notice and comment 
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act,26 with a few 
specialized modifications imposed by the ESA.27 If the FWS lists a species 
as threatened or endangered, section 4 directs the agency to designate 
critical habitat, defined as that habitat “essential to the conservation of the 
species,”28 although the FWS must consider the economic impact of 
designating habitat in making  making this decision.29 
The FWS may initiate the regulatory process for listing a species 
on its own initiative, or in response to a petition filed by interested 
________ 
21.   See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(1)(2), 1538(a). 
22.   16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2018). 
23.   Id. § 1532(20). The ESA broadly defines “species” as including 
subspecies and “distinct population segment,” id. § 1532(16), and implementing 
regulations explain that “[a]ny species or taxonomic group of species” may be listed. 
50 C.F.R. § 424.11(a).  
24.   16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). 
25.    Id. §§ 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E). In rendering a listing decision, the ESA 
also directs the FWS to “tak[e] account [of] those efforts, if any, being made by any 
State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a State or foreign nation, to 
protect such species.” Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
26.   See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
27.   Id. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5). 
28.   Id. § 1532(5)(A). 
29.  Id. § 1533(b)(6). 
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persons.30 Interested persons can similarly petition the FWS to delist or 
down-list a species.31 When the FWS receives a listing petition, section 4 
creates procedures for processing that request and imposes tight deadlines 
within which the agency must respond.32 Within ninety days, the FWS 
must make a finding as to whether a petition contains substantial 
information that a listing is warranted.33 If the FWS makes an affirmative 
ninety-day finding, it must “promptly commence a review of the status of 
the species concerned.”34 Within a year, the FWS must complete its status 
review of the species to determine whether listing the species is 
warranted.35 The Act provides the FWS with a modicum of flexibility 
because it allows the agency to complete a status review by finding that 
the listing of a species is warranted but is precluded by the listing of other, 
higher priority species—in other words, the agency can defer listing a 
species because of constrained resources. 36 Section 4 does, however, 
render the decision that a listing is warranted but precluded subject to 
judicial review.37 If the FWS makes a warranted but precluded finding, it 
must complete another status review, and issue a new twelve-month 
finding within a year.38 This requirement for new twelve-month findings 
every year, each of which is subject to judicial review, limits the FWS’s 
ability to postpone a listing indefinitely.39  
________ 
30.   Id. §§ 1533(a)(1), (3); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(a). The ESA 
incorporates the mechanism that the Administrative Procedure Act provides for 
petitioning an agency for action. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b)(3)(A) (cross-referencing 5 
U.S.C. § 553(e)). 
31.    50 C.F.R. §§ 424.10, 424.14(a). 
32.    See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3). 
33.  Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A). Regulations implementing the ESA explain 
that the substantial-information standard “refers to credible scientific or commercial 
information in support of the petition’s claims such that a reasonable person 
conducting an impartial review would conclude that the action proposed in the petition 
may be warranted.” 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(h)(1)(i). 
34.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A). 
35.  Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(h)(2). 
36.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(h)(2)(iii)(A).  
37.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii). 
38.  Id. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(i); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14 (h)(3).  
39.  Courts have held that “the circumstances under which [the FWS] 
may invoke the excuse of ‘warranted by precluded’ are ‘narrowly defined.’” Center 
for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 466 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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Section 7 of the ESA prohibits federal agencies from taking 
actions jeopardizing the survival of a listed species or adversely modifying 
critical habitat, a rule often referred to simply as the prohibition on 
jeopardy.40 To implement that prohibition, federal agencies must formally 
consult the FWS if a proposed action could affect a listed species,41 and 
seek a “Biological Opinion,” through which the FWS assesses whether the 
proposed action will result in jeopardy.42 If the FWS believes that jeopardy 
________ 
40.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Historically, the FWS “largely collapsed” 
inquiries into adverse modification and jeopardy. TODD AAGAARD, DAVE OWEN & 
JUSTIN PIDOT, PRACTICING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 787 (2017). This occurred because 
regulations implementing the ESA interpreted adverse modification as requiring an 
appreciable increase in the likelihood of extinction. See Interagency Cooperation—
Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Definition of Destruction or Adverse 
Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. 7214, 7215 (Feb. 11, 2016).  In other 
words, a finding of adverse modification would occur only where impacts to critical 
habitat would result in jeopardy to the species. In 2004, the 9th Circuit rejected that 
interpretation because it “obligated [the FWS] to be indifferent to, if not to ignore, the 
recovery goal of critical habitat.” Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004), superseded by regulation as recognized 
in Defenders of Wildlife v. Zinke, 856 F.3d 1248, 1260 (9th Cir. 2017).  In 2016, the 
FWS issued a new regulation expanding the definition of adverse modification of 
critical habitat to encompass modification “that appreciably diminishes the value of 
critical habitat for the conservation of listed species,” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, explaining 
that this new definition “addresses more than mere survival.” 81 Fed. Reg. at 7217. It 
remains to be seen whether this new definition will lead to a significant adjustment in 
the consultation process. 
41.  This obligation to consult will flow to the National Marine 
Fisheries Service if the species in question is marine or anadramous. See supra note 
17. 
42.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b). The agency proposing to take action is 
not formally bound by a Biological Opinion, and could disagree with its conclusions, 
although this rarely occurs. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169–70 (1997). A 
process also exists by which an “endangered species committee,” referred to as the 
“God Squad,” can exempt a project from the jeopardy prohibition. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 
(e)-(h); see Daniel A. Farber, A Tale of Two Cases, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 37 (2001); 
Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process under the Endangered Species Act: 
How the “God Squad” Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 833 n.55 
(1991). That process has rarely been invoked, and the committee has never granted an 
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will occur, it may identify “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the 
proposed action that will achieve the action’s purposes while avoiding 
jeopardy.43 In the words of the Supreme Court, by enacting section 7, 
“Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear 
that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species 
the highest priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it described as 
‘institutionalized caution.’”44  
Where the FWS determines that a federal action will not result in 
jeopardy, or that reasonable and prudent alternatives exist to avoid 
jeopardy, section 7 requires the FWS to issue an incidental take statement 
authorizing a take of the listed species assessed in its Biological Opinion.45 
That statement will include “reasonable and prudent measures”—
essentially mitigation requirements—to minimize the impact of the 
incidental take caused by the federal action.46 So long as the required 
mitigation (and any reasonable and prudent alternatives) are implemented, 
the federal agency proposing to initiate action, and any other party whose 
activities are evaluated in the incidental take statement, may take 
individual members of listed species.47  
While the consultation provisions of section 7 trigger only when 
the federal government acts, the ESA also restricts non-federal actors. 
Section 9 bars anyone from engaging in activities that result in the “take” 
of an endangered wildlife species,48 a prohibition that by regulation has 
generally been extended to threatened wildlife species, in the absence of a 
________ 
exemption. See M. LYNNE CORN ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH FWS, 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA): THE EXEMPTION PROCESS 19 (2017). 
43.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
44.  Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
45.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). 
46.  Id. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii). 
47.  See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1)(iv) (requiring incidental take 
statements to include “terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the 
Federal agency or any applicant”); Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“[A] party that is neither a federal agency nor an applicant can take members of a 
listed species without violating the ESA, provided the actions in question are 
contemplated by an incidental take statement . . . and are conducted in compliance 
with the requirements of that statement.”). 
48.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). Listed plant species receive lesser protection 
under section 9, which only prohibits takes on federal lands or in contravention of 
state law. Id.  
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species-specific rule to the contrary.49 The ESA defines the word “take” to 
include “harm” to a species, and under a longstanding regulatory 
interpretation, the take prohibition extends to “significant habitat 
modification or degradation” that interferes with the behavior of an 
individual member of a listed species.50  
Section 10 authorizes the FWS to issue permits to private parties 
authorizing the incidental take of a listed species,51 and such incidental 
take permits serve as a more limited private-party counterpart to the 
incidental take statements issued under section 7. The FWS may only issue 
incidental take permits after approving a habitat conservation plan for the 
species,52 and the FWS must find that the permit applicant will minimize 
and mitigate the effects of authorized incidental take “to the maximum 
extent practicable.”53 In recent decades, private parties, states, and the 
FWS have increasingly relied on habitat conservation plans and incidental 
take permits, sometimes at a broad, landscape scale.54 Some habitat 
conservation plans and incidental take statements even cover sensitive, but 
unlisted species.55 
Section 11 authorizes civil and criminal penalties for violations of 
the Act, reserving the steepest penalties for violations of section 9’s take 
________ 
49.  Id. at § 1533(d) (authorizing the FWS to extend take prohibition to 
threatened species); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (extending take prohibition to threatened 
wildlife species in the absence of a special rule to the contrary). 
50.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3; see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 696 (1995) (upholding regulations). 
51.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
52.  Id. § 1539(a)(2). 
53.  Id. § 1539(B)(ii). 
54.  See Alejandro E. Camacho et al., Lessons from Areawide, 
Multiagency, Habitat Conservation Plans in California, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,222, 10,225 (2016) (hereinafter Camacho, Lessons); Alejandro E. 
Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive 
Management, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 293, 299–308 (2007) (describing the evolution of 
the habitat conservation plans). 
55.  Frederico M. Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against 
Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a 
Powerful Species Preseration Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109, 171 (1991) (describing 
FWS approach to including nonlisted species in habitat conservation plans and 
legislative history indicating Congress was supportive of that approach). 
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prohibition.56 Section 11 also authorizes citizen suit enforcement against 
private parties and the federal government and the recovery of attorney’s 
fees where such enforcement occurs.57  
 
III.  THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND UNCERTAINTY 
The relative simplicity of the ESA would appear to create specific 
and discernable obligations for the federal government and private parties: 
Thou shall not (private person) take individual members of listed wildlife 
species, nor (federal agency) imperil the survival of those species. The 
ecological imperative appears equally clear: species shall not go extinct. 
This section will explain the ecological and economic uncertainties that 
persist notwithstanding that apparent clarity.  
 
A. Ecological Uncertainty 
Ecological uncertainty involves questions about whether a 
declining species—whether listed under the ESA or not—will continue to 
decline, entirely disappear, or recover. 
On the whole, the ESA has worked fairly well at preventing the 
final demise of species, at least those that have been listed under its 
provisions. The FWS website provides a “boxscore” for the Act, which 
indicates that there are currently 714 domestic fish and wildlife species 
listed as either threatened or endangered, and an additional 942 plant 
species.58 Over the life of the ESA, the FWS has identified only ten listed 
species that have gone extinct.59 The Act has fared less-well, however, in 
species’ recovery.60 The FWS has delisted only 23 species because they 
were recovered.61 Of that already small number, fewer species have been 
________ 
56.  16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)-(b) (2018).  
57.  Id. § 1540(g). 
58.  Listed Species Summary (Boxscore), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/box-score-report (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
59.  See Delisted Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://ecos.fws.gov/ ecp0/reports/delisting-report (last visited Sept. 24, 2017); see 
also Cheever, supra note 17, at 11. 
60.  See Cheever, supra note 15, at 4. 
61.  See Delisted Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://ecos.fws.gov/ ecp0/reports/delisting-report (spreadsheet saved on 10/21/2017 
and on file with author). This number includes only species that are found within the 
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delisted because habitat has been restored or protected.62 Moreover, a 
number of species have gone extinct in the United States without ever 
being listed. The Center for Biological Diversity, an environmental 
organization heavily involved in seeking protections for declining species, 
pegs the number at 83.63 
The ecological uncertainty faced by fish and wildlife species has 
both scientific and legal dimensions. Many features of the natural world 
remain mysterious and unknown.64 The best scientific information about a 
little-seen and little-studied species may amount to little more than 
guesswork and inference.65 Indeed, we may not even learn of the existence 
________ 
United States. Five additional species found in domestic waters and whose protections 
falls to the National Marine Fisheries Service have been delisted due to recovery. 
62.  See John Copeland Nagle, The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law, 
24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 206–07 (2009). John Nagle explains: “In 2008, the 
West Virginia northern flying squirrel became the first species to be removed from 
the ESA’s list of protected species based upon the restoration of the species’ habitat. 
Previous delistings resulted from the elimination of hunting, commercial exploitation, 
pesticides, or other threats.” Id. 
63.  KIERAN SUCKLING ET AL., EXTINCTION AND THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT 1 (2004). That report also identifies the number of listed species gone 
extinct as twenty-three, rather than ten. Id. The report may slightly overcount he 
number of un-listed species gone extinct, for example, it identifies at lists at least one 
bird as extinct that may not be a biologically distinct species. See Ryan P. Kelly et al., 
Science, Policy, and Data-Driven Decisions in a Data Vacuum, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 7, 
26 n.104 (2017).  
64.  See, e.g., Joshua J. Lawler et al., The Scope and Treatment of 
Threats in Endangered Species Recovery Plans, 12 ECOL. APPLICATIONS 663, 663 
(2002) (“Species facing numerous or poorly understood threats . . . are likely to present 
the greater challenge.”). Because a party petitioning to have a species listed bears the 
burden of demonstrating that such a listing is warranted, some species about which 
little information exists may not receive protections precisely because of scientific 
uncertainty. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(h)(1)(i) (“Conclusions drawn in [a] petition 
without he support of credible scientific or commercial information will not be 
considered ‘substantial information.’”); Kelly, supra note 63, at 25 (“Section 4 of the 
ESA is written to avoid Type I error by placing the evidentiary burden on the party 
wishing to list a species as threatened or endangered.”). 
65.  See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered 
Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 
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of a species on the precipice of extinction, perhaps precisely because of its 
rarity. For example, a scientist discovered the snail darter, the small 
species of fish that occasioned the ESA’s first trip to the Supreme Court, 
only shortly before completion of the Tellico Dam threatened to destroy 
the species’ only known habitat.66 And earlier this year, scientists 
announced discovery of a new species of toad living in northern Nevada.67  
Knowledge gaps exist even for heavily studied species. Scientists 
may understand a dwindling species’s primary threats.68 For the greater 
sage-grouse, for example, scientific evidence indicates that the population 
is experiencing a long-term declining trend.69 The FWS determined that 
“the greatest threat” faced by the greater sage-grouse is “habitat loss and 
fragmentation . . . due to a variety of causes, including, but not limited to, 
energy development, infrastructure, invasive species, and wildfire.”70 
Even the noise caused by roads and oil and gas drilling rigs significantly 
________ 
1035–36 (1997) (“Because so little is known about so many disappearing species, the 
best available scientific evidence is often highly uncertain.”).  
66.  See Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1978). 
Later, scientists discovered another small populations of snail darter in an area 
unaffected by the Tellico Dam. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, THE SNAIL DARTER AND 
THE DAM: HOW PORK-BARREL POLITICS ENDANGERED A LITTLE FISH AND KILLED A 
RIVER 346 (2013). 
67.  Michelle R. Gordon et al., A Diamond in the Rough Desert 
Shrublands of the Great Basin in the Western United States: A New Cryptic Toad 
Species (Amphibia: Bufonidae: Bufo (Anaxyrus) discovered in Northern Nevada, 
4290 ZOOTAXA 123 (2017). 
68.  For example, a 2011 decision declining to list the giant Palouse 
earthworm as threatened or endangered explained “there is very little information 
available, and the best available scientific information does not indicate the present or 
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of the [giant Palouse earthworm]'s 
habitat or range from any of the above [human] activities constitutes a threat to the 
species such that listing under the Act is warranted.” 12-Month Finding on a Petition 
to List the Giant Palouse Earthworm (Drilolerius americanus) as Threatened or 
Endangered, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,559 (July 26, 2011); see Kelly, supra note 56, at 21-22. 
69.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month 
Finding on a Petition To List Greater Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus) as an 
Endangered or Threatened Species, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,858, 59,870–71 (Oct. 2, 2015) 
(hereinafter 2015 12-month Finding). 
70.  Id. at 59,888. These are common threats faced by listed species. 
See Lawler, supra note 57, at 664. 
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affects mating behavior.71 Much remains unknown, however, about the 
magnitude of these threats, how they interact, and how best to minimize 
them. Indeed, scientists do not fully understand the population dynamics 
of the species in the absence of anthropogenic influences.72 Nor can 
scientists confidently predict the extent to which climate change will affect 
the greater sage-grouse and the habitat upon which it depends, although 
climate change will likely magnify some existing threats like the spread of 
invasive species and increased incidents of wildfire.73  
The limitations of our scientific understanding create ecological 
uncertainty because new, currently unrecognized threats may emerge and 
the severity of known threats may be underappreciated.74 Even foreseeable 
cataclysmic events, like wildfires, may imperil listed species if they occur 
in the wrong location or at the wrong time.75 Moreover, scientific 
uncertainty can itself feedback into legal uncertainty, because the FWS has 
declined to list species because inadequate information exists. In other 
words, a rare, little understood species may remain unprotected precisely 
because its population is too small or too well concealed.76 All of these 
gaps in our knowledge and ability to predict future events means that the 
results of conservation efforts cannot be entirely known, even if perfectly 
tuned to existing scientific understanding.  
Conservation efforts are, of course, themselves flawed; scientific 
uncertainty is compounded by imperfections in federal legal protections 
afforded to wildlife. The obligations imposed by the ESA trigger only after 
________ 
71.  Jessica L. Blickley et al., Experimental Evidence for the Effects of 
Chronic Anthropogenic Noise on Abundance of Greater Sage-Grouse at Leks, 26 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 461, 467 (2011). 
72.  See, e.g., 2015 12-month Finding, supra note 62, at 59,868 
(explaining that the “drivers of” sage grouse population cycles “are unknown”). 
73.  Id. at 59,898. 
74.  See Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 113, 177-180 (2015) (discussing varieties of uncertainty relevant for 
policymaking). 
75.  See Livia Alberck-Ripka, For an Endangered Animal, a Fire or 
Hurricane Can Mean the End, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/10/25/climate/fires-hurricanes-endangered-animals.html. 
76.  See Kelly, supra note 56, at 21–22. 
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a species is listed as threatened or endangered.77 While FWS’s decision 
whether to list a species is supposed to be based solely on scientific 
information, policymakers at times have substituted their political 
preferences for the scientific analysis of career staff.78 Moreover, even 
where the FWS considers unadulterated scientific information, decisions 
about whether a species qualifies as threatened or endangered involve a 
degree of discretion, which can be exercised in diverging fashion for 
different species at different times.79 Even where this does not occur, 
politics invariably influences the speed and timing of decisions, and 
species have gone extinct while awaiting a decision by the FWS on a 
listing petition.80  
The policy tool embodied in the ESA also creates uncertainty. The 
ESA attempts to safeguard species primarily by restraining harmful human 
activities. The obligations placed on private individuals are entirely 
negative in nature—section 9 prohibits take of individual members of 
listed species—81 although private individuals must assume affirmative 
________ 
77.  See Byrne, supra note 13, at 345–46.  
78.  See Juliet Eilperin, Bush Appointee Said to Reject Advice on 
Endangered Species, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2006) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/29/AR2006102900776.html. 
79.  See Kalyani Robbins, Strength in Numbers: Setting Quantitative 
Criteria for Listing Species under the Endangered Species Act, 27 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 1, 13-14 (2009) (arguing that the listing process vests the FWS with “a 
[l]ot of [d]iscretion”); Holy Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered 
Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 
1124 (1997) (“Not only do the [wildlife] agencies refuse to formulate explicit listing 
standards [to guide listing decision], they offer no apology for the apparent 
inconsistency of their decisions.”).  
80.  See Byrne, supra note 13, at 345 (“Th[e] [listing] process is 
notoriously slow and fraught with analytic and political obstacles.”). In 2016, the FWS 
issued a new methodology to prioritize listing decisions, but the methodology is a 
guidance document and not a binding regulation, and even according to its terms, it 
allows the FWS to reprioritize consideration of species based on “any special 
circumstances.” Methodology for Prioritizing Status Reviews and Accompanying 12-
Month Findings on Petitions for Listing Under the Endangered Species Act, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 49,248, 49,250 (July 27, 2016). 
81.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (defining “take”), id. § 1538(a) (prohibiting 
“take”).  
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conservation obligations to receive incidental take permits exempting their 
activities from that negative constraint.82  
While section 7(a)(1) includes a provision requiring federal 
agencies to use their existing authority to promote the recovery of listed 
species,83 the FWS has not promulgated regulations to implement that 
provision.84 A few courts have ruled that federal agencies have some ill-
defined affirmative obligation under section 7(a)(1),85 but those decisions 
have yet to translate into specific enforceable obligations.86 The ESA also 
directs the FWS to develop recovery plans for each listed species, but such 
plans do not impose enforceable obligations.87 Those recovery plans may 
also be insulated from judicial review; at least one district court ruled that 
they do not constitute a final agency action that can serve as the basis for 
a lawsuit under the Adminsitrative Procedure Act.88 
________ 
82.  Id. § 1539. 
83.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). 
84.  While the affirmative conservation obligations imposed by § 
7(a)(1) essentially remain dormant because the FWS has not implemented them and 
courts have ruled that they cannot be enforced in citizen suits, a future administration 
coud attempt to rely on them to impose additioan, affirmative obligations on federal 
agencies. See Kalyani Robbins, The Bioodiversity Pardadigm Shift: Adapting the 
Endangered Species Act to Climate Change, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 57, 94 
(2015). 
85.  See Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1146 (11th Cir. 
2008) (“[S]ection 7(a)(1) imposes a judicially reviewable obligation upon all agencies 
to carry out programs for the conservation of endangered and threatened species.”); 
Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 616 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e conclude that 
Congress intended to impose an affirmative duty on each federal agency to conserve 
each of the species listed pursuant to § 1533.”). 
86.  The regulation updating the interpretation of the adverse 
modification of critical habitat provisions of section 7 to account for recovery, and not 
just jeopardy, is of too new a vintage to assess its impact. See Interagency 
Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Definition of 
Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. 7214, 7215 
(Feb. 11, 2016). 
87.  See Conservation Congress v. Finley, 774 F.3d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
88.  See Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. Thorson, 260 F. Supp. 3d 
1338 (D. Oregon, June 1, 2017).  
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Preventing human activity that directly and immediately harms or 
kills a listed species may offer sufficient protection for species imperiled 
by hunting, trapping, or other human use. The problem for many listed 
species today, however, is that restraining harmful anthropogenic actions 
may be inadequate to reverse their decline. For example, the ESA’s 
negative constraints do not effectively address the spread of invasive 
species, a leading risk for more than forty percent of listed species. 89 Once 
an invasive species has taken hold, active management efforts may be 
required to ameliorate that threat, and those efforts often lie beyond the 
coercive force of the ESA.90 Similarly, the prohibitions on take and 
jeopardy seem ill-fitted to address the risks posed by climate change; 
uncertainty exists about the localized effects of climate change, which will 
significantly alter habitat without any specific and direct causal activity 
that can be targeted by sections 7 and 9.91 Even if the climate risk faced by 
a particular species is clear—for example, the threat to the Polar Bear is 
largely from climate change—it is hard to translate the take and jeopardy 
prohibitions into a context where every human and a huge swath of human 
________ 
89.  David Pimentel et al., Update on the Environmental and Economic 
Costs Associated with Alien-Invasive Species in the United States, 15 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 273 (2005). 
90.  See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Management and Regulatory 
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmaticsm, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 977 (2003) 
(“[T]he ESA section 9 “no-take” standard does not mandage affirmative conservation 
measures designed to confer positive benefits on protected species or biological 
communities, such as native vegetation restoration, invasive species removal, and 
prescribed burns to mimic the natural fire disturbance regime.”). Affirmative 
conservation obligations, however, can be imposed as conditions of incidental take 
permits. Id.  
91.  Whether the ESA in its current form can continue to effectively 
stave off extinction as climate change reshapes habitat is an open question.  See J.B. 
Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-
Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (“[G]iven the reasonably anticipated 
trajectory of global climate change and its effects on ecosystems, there soon may be 
no practical way to administer the ESA in its present form for those species [imperiled 
by climate change].”).  In a recent article, Kalyani Robbins considers the interplay of 
climate change and the ESA and suggests a range of modifications that would reorient 
the ESA to facilitate affirmative conservation, rather than simply prohibiting take. See 
Robbins, supra note 78 at 62.  
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activities contribute.92 Conserving species as the Earth’s climate 
increasingly shifts will likely require active conservation efforts.  
Moreover, the binary nature of the listing process creates further 
ecological uncertainty because it can lead to perverse incentives for even 
the law abiding private property owner.93 Prior to a species becoming 
listed, the ESA does not restrict harm to that species or destruction of its 
habitat. As Peter Byrne has recognized, preservation statutes with this 
structure “create incentives toward destroying the resources they seek to 
protect.”94 A land owner interested in eventually developing her property 
may do so sooner for fear that species who use it may become listed. And 
a land owner whose property includes suitable but unoccupied habitat for 
a listed species may destroy or degrade that habitat to avoid attracting the 
species. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that some property owners may 
illegally kill listed species on their property before they are detected by 
authorities.95 And even when evidence of take comes to light, federal 
officials may be reluctant to enforce except in egregious circumstances.96 
 
________ 
92.  See Ruhl, supra note 91, at 41 (noting that if contributing to climate 
change counts as “take” of climate-sensitive species, “if anyone is taking the species, 
everyone is taking the species.”) 
93.  See Byrne, supra note 15, at 345–46 (2015); Patrick Parenteau, 
Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Era of Mass 
Extinction, 22 WM. & ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 281–82 (1998). 
94.  Byrne, supra note 13, at 346. 
95.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Book Review, Noah by the Numbers: An 
Empirical Evaluation of the Endangered Species Act, CORNELL L.REV. 364-65. These 
perverse incentives are consistent with empirical evidence indicating that those listed 
species who face pressure from economic development fare more poorly than those 
that do not. Id. at 381-82. 
96.  See Cheever, supra note 55, at 111-12. As Fred Cheever explained 
many years ago: “The unwillingness to enforce the section 9 taking prohibition fully 
has distorted the law of endangered species, creating a system of unequal justice in 
which some groups and individuals are taken to court for acts that would go 
unquestioned if committed by others.” Id.  
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B. Economic Uncertainty 
Economic uncertainty is a related phenomenon, and is often 
entwined with aspects of ecological uncertainty. Economic uncertainty 
involves questions about shifting regulatory obligations, and whether 
investments tied to particular land uses may be impeded or entirely 
destroyed by the protections afforded to a listed species. This economic 
uncertainty is distinct from the costs associated with the ESA; I am 
interested here in lack of predictability, rather than the magnitude of 
costs.97  
One reason the ESA creates uncertainty is that, unlike many other 
environmental laws,98 it does not differentiate between new and existing 
activities. No statutory provision exempts land uses or other activities 
occurring at the time a species is listed from the prohibition on take. 
Federal agencies also have an obligation to reinitiate section 7 consultation 
with the FWS if new information—including the listing of a new species—
arises about the impact of the federal action, and the FWS may add new 
mitigation requirements to an incidental take statement at that time.99  
As a consequence, changing scientific understandings and 
biological facts may translate into new legal obligations and regulatory 
restrictions. This creates one source of economic uncertainty.  
________ 
97.  It is the unquantifiable nature of uncertainty that distinguishes it 
from risk. See Pidot, supra note 74, at 178–79 (distinguishing among risk, foreseeable 
uncertainty, and unforeseeable uncertainty).  
98.  Many components of the Clean Air Act, for example, impose 
pollution abatement requirements on new and modified sources, but leave the 
regulation of existing sources largely to the states. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 165(a) 
(requiring preconstruction permit for new major sources); Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-
Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 31 (2006) 
(explaining that vintage-differentiated regulations are “prominent features of a diverse 
set of federal environmental statutes and regulations, state and local environmental 
laws, as well as a host of non-environmental regulations”). 
99.  See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. The obligation to reinitiate consultation, 
unlike the obligation to supplement an environmental impact statement, does not 
necessarily end simply because the federal action is complete. In Cottonwood Envtl. 
Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth 
Circuit found reinitation required for a forest plan amendment that had already gone 
into effect because the Forest Service could again amend the plan.  
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Species also move around, filling new habitats in new locations.100 
This trend is likely to increase as climate change leads to an unprecedented 
degree of migration for species no longer able to find hopspitable 
conditions within their traditional ranges.101 And new populations of 
species (and even entirely new species) may be discovered; the Tennessee 
Valley Authority was likely surprised to learn that the Tellico Dam 
threatened extinction to a species of which no one had previously heard.102 
Such movements and discoveries may impose new and unforeseen legal 
obligations on economic actors. 
Legal uncertainty also leads to economic uncertainty. Just as the 
malleability of the listing process creates uncertainty for species, it creates 
uncertainty for economic actors. Most listing processes take years,103 
providing substantial forewarning, although the ESA does authorize 
emergency listing of species facing imminent dangers.104 For long-term 
business decisions, a few years of notice may be insufficient to fully 
accommodate the needs of species, injecting a degree of unpredictability 
into investment decisions in areas that contain sensitive, although unlisted, 
species. Whether and when a listing for a particular species will occur can 
also be difficult to predict.105 The precise timing of a listing decision may 
________ 
100.  See Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The 
Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1999) (“Many animals are highly 
mobile and difficult to control, making it virtually impossible to guarantee that they 
will remain at a reintroduction site.”).  
101.  See Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature 
and Natural Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 181 
(2010) (“[M]any species will need to shift their geographic distributions markedly or 
go extinct, as the locations they currently occupy will become unsuitable for them.”); 
Chris D. Thomas, et al., Extinction Risk from Cliamte Change, 427 NATURE 145, 145 
(2004) (estimating proportion of species threatened with extinction under various 
estimates of climate change). 
102.  See Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158–59 (1978). 
103.  See Daniel J. Rohlf, Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act: Top 
Ten Issues for the Next Thirty Years, 34 ENVTL. L. 483, 500 (2004). 
104.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7). 
105.  See Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and “Takings”: A 
Call for Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 366 (1994) (“When 
a species is listed under the terms of the ESA, there is an effective freeze across the 
habitat occupied by that species.”).  
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have significant consequences for shorter term investments because 
activities entirely legal the day before a species is listed may violate the 
take prohibition the day afterward. Moreover, if a species is listed as 
threatened, rather than endangered, the FWS has discretion to exempt 
some or all categories of activities that impact that species from the take 
prohibition.106 Whether the FWS will choose to exercise such discretion 
may be uncertain, and such rules can themselves create legal controversy. 
For example, the FWS recently unsuccessfully sought to utilize this 
authority to create federal enforcement of voluntary and state wildlife 
conservation efforts, by issuing a rule that immunized actions taken by 
those participating in such efforts from the take prohibition as it applied to 
the lesser prairie chicken.107 A district court struck down that rule after oil 
and gas interests filed a lawsuit.108 
Under the leadership of Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, 
the FWS developed a number of regulatory initiatives to reduce 
uncertainty for private actors.109 These initiatives included development of 
habitat conservation plans, including at a regional level,110 safe harbor 
agreements,111 candidate conservation agreements,112 and a “no surprises” 
________ 
106.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a). 
107.   See Permian Basin Petroleum Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 127 F. 
Supp. 3d 700, 704 (W.D. Tx. 2015) (vacating listing decision of the lesser prairie 
chicken that had included a rule to exempt participants in state conservation program 
from take prohibition). 
108.  Id. 
109.  See Ruhl, supra note 9, at 33–34; Babbitt, supra note 105, at 366 
(“The problem is that the people who have been charged with administering the ESA 
have not explored imaginative and creative ways to arrange possibilities to give effect 
to a wonderful, expansive Act.”). 
110.  See, e.g., Camacho, Lessons, supra note 54, at 10,222 (describing 
and evaluating mutliagency, areawide HCPs in California). 
111.  See Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation 
Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726 (June 17, 1999).  Safe harbor 
agreements provide property owners who engage in conservation measures for listed 
species with a guarantee that they “will not be subjected to increased property-use 
restrictions if their efforts attract listed species to their property or increase the number 
or distribution of listed species already present.” Id. at 32,707. 
112.  See Id. at 32,716. Property owners who enter candidate 
conservation agreements with Assurances undertake voluntary conservation efforts 
for a candidate species (i.e. one that has been identified for potential listing) in 
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policy.113 The FWS has subsequently pursued other approaches to increase 
regulatory certainty,114 including the conservation plan for the greater 
sage-grouse to which this Article will now turn.  
 
IV.  THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S FRAMEWORK FOR 
GREATER SAGE-GROUSE CONSERVATION 
More than 460,000 square miles of sagebrush steppe once 
occupied portions of thirteen western states and three Canadian 
provinces.115 Large numbers of greater sage-grouse thrived across this 
ecosystem. The first western documentation of the distribution and 
abundance of the bird appeared in the journals of Merriweather Lewis and 
William Clark: “The Heath Cock or cock of the Plains,” as they referred 
to the bird, “is found in the Plains of Columbia and are in great abundance 
from the ent[]rance of Lewis’s river to the mountains which pass the 
Columbia between the Great Falls and Rapids of that river.”116 By 2000, 
more than eighty percent of the sagebrush steppe ecosystem was degraded 
________ 
exchange for an assurance that no further obligations will be imposed on them if the 
species covered by the agreement is listed. Id. at 32,726.  
113.  See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 
63 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (Feb. 23, 1998). Under the “no surprises” policy, a party that has 
secured an incidental take permit pursuant to a habitat conservation plan will not be 
subjected to additional obligations with respect to covered species. Id. at 8,859. 
114.  For example, the FWS issued a policy to govern its consideration 
of existing conservation efforts in making listing decisions in part to “provide[] 
information to the groups interested in developing agreements or plans that would 
contribute to making it unnecessary for the FWS to list.” Policy for Evaluation of 
Conservation Efforts While Making Listing Decision, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,100, 15,100 
(Mar. 28, 2003). 
115.  2015 12-month Finding, supra note 69, at 59,864; see Neil E. West, 
Managing for Biodiversity of Rangelands, 101, 104 in BIODIVERSITY IN 
AGROECOSYSTEMS (Wanda W. Collins & Calvin O. Qualset eds., 1999); Endangered 
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-day Finding for Petitions to List the Greater 
Sage-Grouse as Threatened or Endangered, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,484, 21,486 (Apr. 21, 
2004) (hereinafter “2004 90-day Finding”). 
116.  See Journal of William Clark, Sunday, March 2nd, 1806, Journals 
of the Lewis & Clark Expedition, available at https://lewisandclarkjournals.unl.edu 
/item/lc.jrn.1806-03-02#lc.jrn.1806-03-02.02.  
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by a range of factors, including agriculture, urbanization, invasive species, 
and oil and gas development.117 Today greater sage-grouse occupy about 
half of their historic range and have experienced a marked long-term 
decline in population.118  
The bird’s dwindling numbers and loss of habitat has led to 
significant controversy. In 1999, wildlife advocates filed the first listing 
petition with the FWS to list the greater sage-grouse as threatened or 
endangered throughout some or all of its range, and more petitions 
followed.119 In response, the FWS initiated a status review of the species 
in 2004.120 In 2005, the FWS concluded the status review and issued a 
twelve-month finding determining that a listing was not warranted.121  
Shortly thereafter, the Western Watersheds Project, an 
environmental organization active in the intermountain west that had filed 
earlier listing petitions for the bird, challenged the validity of the FWS’s 
12-month finding in the federal district court of Idaho.122 In 2007, the 
district court vacated the FWS’s decision, finding that it had failed to rely 
on the best available science in making its decision and that the decision-
making process had been infected by politically motivated interference 
from a deputy assistant secretary charged with overseeing the FWS.123  
________ 
117.  See Miles A Hemstrom, et al., Sagebrush-Steppe Vegetation 
Dynamics and Restoration Potential in the Interior Columbia Basin, U.S.A., 16 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1243, 1244 (2002). 
118.  2015 12-month Finding, supra note 69, at 59,864–59,871. 
119.  Id. at 59,869.  
120.  2004 90-day Finding, supra note 115, at 21,494. 
121.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month 
Finding for Petitions To List the Greater Sage-Grouse as Threatened or Endangered, 
70 Fed. Reg. 2244, 2279 (Jan. 12, 2005). 
122.  W. Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 
1173 (D. Idaho 2007). 
123.  Id. at 1185, 1188-89. The inappropriate political meddling 
identified by the court was part of a broader scandal involving Julie MacDonald, a 
deputy assistant secretary at the Department of the Interior, who repeatedly interfered 
with the FWS’s scientific conclusions about a range of species. See DEPARTMENT OF 
THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLICY 
(2008); Eilperin, supra note 78. The court explained: “MacDonald had extensive 
involvement in the sage-grouse listing decision, used her intimidation tactics in this 
case, and altered the ‘best science’ to fit a not-warranted decision.” 535 F.Supp.2d at 
1188.  
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In 2010, the FWS completed another status review of the greater 
sage-grouse, this time issuing a warranted but precluded finding. In other 
words, the FWS found the bird warranted listing as threatened or 
endangered, but other priority listing work prevented it from pursuing a 
listing at that time.124 This finding, along with similar warranted but 
precluded findings for an array of other species, became part of a 
constellation of lawsuits brought by environmental groups, which were 
consolidated for pre-trial motions before the multi-district litigation 
panel.125 Two multi-species settlements terminated those lawsuits, one 
with WildEarth Guardians and a second with the Center for Biological 
Diversity.126 Pursuant to those settlements, the FWS agreed to a timetable 
for reviewing the status of more than 250 species, including the greater 
sage-grouse.127 The FWS promised that rather than rely on a warranted but 
precluded finding to further postpone the listing process, it would conclude 
those status reviews either by finding that a listing was warranted or not 
warranted, and then proceed accordingly.128  
Under the settlement, the FWS promised to complete its status 
review for greater sage-grouse by 2015. This created an opportunity—and 
significant incentive—for federal and state government agencies, industry 
groups, and non-profit organizations to attempt to develop conservation 
plans for the greater sage-grouse of sufficient rigor and strength to enable 
the FWS to find that a listing was not warranted because existing 
regulatory measures sufficiently reduced the risk of extinction.129  
________ 
124.  12-Month Findings for Petitions to List the Greater Sage-Grouse 
(Centrocercus urophasianus) as Threatened or Endangered, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,910, 
13,910 (Mar. 23, 2010). 
125.  See Andrew C. Mergen & Sommer Engels, MDL Litigation and 
Environmental Law—An Emerging Trend, 42 No. 4 ABA TRENDS 6, 7 (2011) 
(discussing use of multi district litigation panel to address listing lawsuits). 
126.  See Courtney R. McVean & Justin R. Pidot, Environmental 
Settlements and Administrative Law, 39 HARV. L. REV. 191, 224–26 (2015).  
127.  Id. at 225. 
128.  Id. In exchange, the environmental plaintiffs agreed to limit the 
number of new listing petitions they filed. Id. 
129.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D) (identifying “the inadequacy of 
exiting regulation mechanisms” as a factor in listing a species); 2015 12-month 
Finding, supra note 69, at 98,871 (“The 2010 finding has galvanized a rangewide 
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What emerged was a comprehensive plan for the conservation of 
greater sage-grouse on federal lands throughout the western United States, 
which the BLM and the Forest Service implemented through ninety-eight 
amendments to federal land use plans.130 The agencies published draft plan 
amendments in 2013 and finalized those amendments in 2015.131 The plan 
amendments committed the agencies to authorizing surface disturbing 
activities within most habitat of the greater sage-grouse only if mitigation 
efforts would more than fully offset those impacts. In other words, project 
approvals would need to result in a “net conservation gain to the sage 
grouse.”132 The agencies also initiated a withdrawal of approximately ten 
million acres of high-value sagebrush habitat on public lands, so that those 
lands would no longer be available for mining claims or mineral leasing.133 
Ten of the eleven states with sagebrush habitat also updated their own 
conservation plans.134 On October 2, 2015, the FWS found that listing the 
greater sage-grouse was not warranted because federal and state 
conservation efforts had sufficiently addressed threats to the species.135  
This approach to conserving the greater sage-grouse attempted to 
address elements of the ecological and economic uncertainty identified in 
Part III by recognizing linkages between the two. The federal government 
________ 
conservation effort that includes new management plans developed by Federal and 
State agencies to establish regulatory mechanisms adequate to address identified 
threats.”). 
130.  See U.S. Forest Service, Common Questions & Answers: BLM-
USFS Greater Sage-Grouse Conservation Plans, https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/ 
files/common-qa-greater-sage-grouse.pdf; Scott Streater, Interior proposes banning 
new mining on 10M sage grouse acres, WYOFILE (Sept. 29, 2015) http://www. 
wyofile.com/interior-proposes-banning-new-mining-10m-sage-grouse-acres/. 
131.  Notice of Availability of the Record of Decision and Approved 
Resource Management Plan Amendments for the Great Basin Region Greater Sage 
Grouse Sub-Regions of Idaho and Southwestern Montana; Nevada and Northeastern 
California; Oregon; and Utah, 80 Fed. Reg. 57,633 (Sept. 24, 2015); Notice of 
Availability of the Nevada and Northeastern California Greater Sage-Grouse Draft 
Land Use Plan Amendments and Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 78 Fed. Reg. 
65,701 (Nov. 1, 2013). 
132.  2015 12-month Finding, supra note 69, at 59,881 (“All of the 
Federal Plans require that impacts to sage-grouse habitat are mitigated and that 
compensatory mitigation provides a net conservation gain to the species.”). 
133.   Id. at 59,878. 
134.   Id. at 59,873. 
135.   Id. at 59,858. 
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engaged broadly with the states and other stakeholders in developing the 
conservation plans and took into account state-specific issues.136 
Moreover, the FWS began to enter into candidate conservation agreements 
prior to the conclusion of its status review to encourage voluntary 
conservation efforts and provide assurances to parties that if they engaged 
in adequate conservation, no more would be required of them.137  
The provisions of the BLM and the Forest Service land use plan 
amendments also allow for flexibility. Resource users on federal lands will 
bear some increased costs as they implement mitigation measures to 
achieve a net conservation gain for the species, but meeting that standard 
will reduce the likelihood that a listing will be needed in the future. The 
plans also do not dictate how resource users must achieve a net 
conservation gain, allowing for collaboration and innovation among 
stakeholders, including private parties and states. That effort has already 
resulted in at least one agreement between a state and the federal 
government. In April 2016, the Obama Administration entered into an 
agreement with the State of Nevada to authorize use of a compensatory 
mitigation tradable credits system developed by Nevada to enable federal 
resource users to offset inpacts on public lands by engaging in 
________ 
136.   This collaboration occurred, in part, through a state-federal sage-
grouse task force formed by western governors and the Dep’t of the Interior. See Sage-
Grouse Inventory: 2014 Conservation Initiatives, at 9, W. Governors’ Ass’n (Mar. 
2015), http://westgov.org/images/editor/2014_WGA_Sage_Grouse_Inventory_ Final 
_lo_res.pdf; Goldfuss, supra note 1. For a discussion of the collaboration between the 
federal government and other stakeholders by Jim Lyons, a former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Lands and Minerals during the Obama Administration who was 
personally involved, see Jim Lyons, Lessons Learned from the State-Federal Effort to 
Conserve the Greater Sage-Grouse, Blog of the Center for American Progress (July 
24, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2017/ 
07/24/ 436367/lessons-learned-state-federal-effort-conserve-greater-sage-grouse/. 
137.   See Ann Haas, Farmers and Ranchers in Eastern Oregon Sign on 
as Partners to Conserve the Sage-Grouse, a Candidate Species, https://www.fws.gov/ 
endangered/map/ESA_success_stories/OR/OR_story4/index.html (last visited Nov. 
19, 2017); Press Release: Secretary Jewell, Governor Brown, Deputy Under 
Secretary Mills Celebrate Landmark Agreement to Conserve up to 2.3 Million Acres 
of Sagebrush Habitat in Oregon, U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture (Mar. 27, 2015); available 
at https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2015/03/27/secretary-jewell-governor-
brown-deputy-under-secretary-mills. 
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conservation actions elsewhere.138 The collaborative spirit that resulted in 
the agreement with Nevada also led to the two public-private agreements 
discussed in Part V. 
 
V.  CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS WITH MINING COMPANIES 
Part IV provides a cursory overview of the Obama 
Administration’s prolonged, complex, and multifaceted greater sage-
grouse planning effort. This Part discusses a narrow facet of that effort in 
greater detail: two public-private conservation agreements. These 
agreements were designed to increase economic certainty for the two 
companies that negotiated and entered into them—Barrick Gold of North 
America and Newmont Mining Corporation—under the BLM’s land use 
plan amendments, while also increasing ecological certainty for the greater 
sage-grouse by obtaining earlier, less piecemeal conservation of habitat on 
both public and private lands. While the FWS has a history of using 
candidate conservation agreements as a means of encouraging 
conservation of declining species prior to a listing, the Barrick Agreement 
and Newmont Agreement are unique because they integrate private 
conservation efforts with the BLM’s public lands conservation plans, all 
of which were engineered to conserve the greater sage-grouse in the 
absence of a listing. 
 
A.  Features of the Barrick and Newmont Agreements  
The Department of the Interior, through the BLM and the FWS, 
and Barrick signed the “Barrick Nevada Sage-Grouse Bank Enabling 
Agreement” on March 25, 2015.139 The Barrick Agreement preceded by 
several months the completion of the FWS’s 2015 status review for greater 
sage-grouse and the BLM’s adoption of final land use plan amendments, 
and was based on a draft land use plan amendment for Nevada and 
________ 
138.   See Press Release: State of Nevada and Federal Agencies Sign 
Conservation Credit System Agreement (Apr. 29, 2016), available at 
http://clearinghouse.nv.gov/public/Notice/2016/E2016-137.pdf. 
139.   Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 33. The Barrick Agreement 
was signed by the Nevada state director of the BLM and the reginal director of the 
FWS. Id. at 33.  
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northeastern California.140 The same federal parties, Newmont, and the 
State of Nevada—through its Department of Conservation & Natural 
Resources and Department of Wildlife—signed a “Conservation 
Framework Agreement” on August 30, 2016.141 Both Agreements 
envision use of a mitigation credit system by which the companies can 
generate credits through conservation activities that could then be used to 
offset surface-disturbing activities on federal lands. 
Despite the differences in their timing, the two Agreements 
contain several similar features. First, the Agreements identify that the 
respective companies have mining and grazing operations on private and 
public lands in sagebrush habitat.142 The Barrick Agreement is the more 
detailed of the two, explaining that  
 
Barrick conducts extensive mining operations on lands in Nevada 
that are under BLM’s jurisdiction, and on lands owned by Barrick. 
Barrick also holds Allotments of approximately 80,000 animal 
unit months for cattle operation on public lands in Nevada 
administered by the BLM, and also owns approximately 250,000 
acres of private lands in Nevada that are used for livestock 
ranching purposes.143  
 
The Newmont Agreement provides simply that “Newmont 
conducts mineral exploration and mining operations on both private and 
public lands in Nevada and owns or manages significant tracts of land in 
the State” and that “[t]hrough its wholly owned subsidiary, Elko Land & 
________ 
140.   See Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 10; Notice of Availability 
of the Nevada and Northeastern California Greater Sage-Grouse Draft Land Use 
Plan Amendments and Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,701 
(Nov. 1, 2013). 
141.   Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 18-19. Like the Barrick 
Agreement, the Newmont Agreement was signed by federal officials in regional 
offices, specifically the Nevada state director of BLM and the supervisor of the Reno 
Fish and Wildlife Office, id. at 18, but unlike the Barrick Agreement the Assistant 
Secretary of Land and Minerals Management was also a signatory. Id. at 19. 
142.   Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 1; Newmont Agreement, 
supra note 12, at 3.  
143.   Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 1. 
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Livestock Company, Newmont manages several ranches in northern 
Nevada.”144 The size of Newmont’s interests are not enumerated.   
Second, the Agreements include commitments by the companies 
to engage in conservation projects for greater sage-grouse. The Barrick 
Agreement states that Barrick will engage in projects to achieve “the 
preservation, restoration, and/or enhancement of sagebrush ecosystems by 
implementation of Projects to be agreed upon among the Parties.”145 The 
Newmont Agreement states that Newmont will enagage in projects 
through which “Newmont will voluntarily manage certain of the 
company’s privately operated Nevada ranchlands in a manner that 
promotes conservation of sagebrush species,” and that Newmont “may 
propose sagebrush ecosystem enhancement measures on lands managed 
by BLM.”146  
Third, the Agreements provide the federal government with a role 
in approving, within discrete timeframes, project plans for the 
conservation efforts of the mining companies. Project plans would include 
information about the location, baseline conditions, project components, 
goals and objectives, performance measures, monitoring and reporting 
protocols, and anticipated mitigation credits generated.147 Plans would be 
submitted to the government agencies, and a meeting to discuss the 
projects would follow, within fifteen days under the Newmont Agreement 
and sixty days under the Barrick Agreement.148 Under the Barrick 
Agreement, “[o]nce the Parties approve the Projects and associated Project 
Plans . . . Barrick agrees to implement the approved Projects.”149 The 
Newmont Agreement does not expressly require approval of project plans 
by the federal government, but rather envisions a process by which the 
________ 
144.   Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 3. 
145.   Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 1; id. at 13 (“[T]he Parties 
will identify and agree upon Project Plans and Conservation Actions that Barrick will 
implement on the Bank Property and public lands.”) 
146.   Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 1; id at 9 (“Newmont will 
propose project plans that identify the conservation practices Newmont will undertake 
on the subject property and identify a proposed schedule for implementation . . . .”). 
147.   Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 14-15; Newmont Agreement, 
supra note 12, at 9-10. 
148.   Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 14; Newmont Agreement, 
supra note 12, at 10. 
149.   Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 14. 
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agencies will “review and resolve project plans.”150 Further, the 
Agreement does not include an express and specific commitment requiring 
implementation by Newmont of project plans that have completed the 
review process. The Newmont Agreement, unlike the Barrick Agreement, 
also includes a process for the proposal and review of pilot projects.151 
Fourth, the Agreements include provisions for calculating credits. 
The Barrick Agreement adopts a credit and debit methodology for sage-
grouse conservation developed by the Nature Conservancy.152 The 
Newmont Agreement, by contrast, adopts the Nevada Conservation Credit 
System (CCS) as the primary evaluation tool, but allows Newmont to 
propose alternative measuring techniques, such as that developed by the 
Nature Conservancy, if “CCS is not available, implementable, or 
appropriate, in whole or in part, at the time of project proposal or 
implementation.”153 The Agreements take different approaches to the 
companies’ use of the credits they generate from conservation projects. 
The Barrick Agreement provides that credits “may be used in connection 
with Barrick’s proposed future mining operations, including expansions to 
existing operations, new greenfield projects, or other projects that require 
DOI approval,”154 and that “[a]ny transfer . . . of Credits by Barrick to a 
third party will require an amendment” to the Agreement.155 The Newmont 
Agreement, on the other hand, expressly authorizes Newmont to use or 
sell credits at its discretion.156 
Fifth, the Agreements provide that the use of credits cannot offset 
reasonably avoidable impacts.157 The Agreements, therefore, comport with 
________ 
150.   Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 10. 
151.   Id. at 8–9. 
152.   Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 1. 
153.  Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 8. 
154.  Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 3. 
155.   Id. at 19. 
156.  Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 8. 
157.  Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining that projects 
undertaken “will achieve a Net Conservation Gain for sage-grouse that BLM and the 
FWS can measure against the impacts of certain of the company’s future proposals for 
operations in Nevada that cannot be reasonably avoided.”); Id. at 11 (“Credits and 
Debits will be applied only to impacts that will remain after implementation of 
practicable avoidance and minimization measures.”); Newmont Agreement, supra 
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the long-established “mitigation hierarchy,” which requires efforts to 
avoid and minimize impacts before compensatory mitigation can be used 
to offset residual impacts.158  
Sixth, the Agreements identify “net conservation gain” as the goal 
for measuring whether credits generated from conservation projects 
adequately mitigate for new surface disturbing activities occurring in sage-
grouse habitat.159  
Seventh, the Agreements include commitments on the part of the 
BLM related to the use of credits when the agency approves projects on 
public lands, although the Agreements are careful to retain the agency’s 
discretion in future decision-making processes. The language used to 
accomplish that is somewhat different, and of the two, the Barrick 
Agreement uses stronger and more definite language. The BLM appears 
to provide a firm commitment to use the Nature Conservancy 
methodology to calculate both credits earned by Barrick’s conservation 
efforts and the debits attributable to mining operations in the absence of 
mutual agreement to a different methodology by the BLM and Barrick.160 
The Agreement does include specific limitations clauses, indicating that 
the commitments made by the BLM are methodological, rather than 
substantive. Additionally, the Agreement indicates that it does not 
“[c]haracterize, define, quantify, or otherwise pre-judge” the BLM’s 
environmental analysis and decisions related to future mining and “any 
avoidance, minimization or Compensatory Mitigation activities that may 
be required to be undertaken by Barrick as a condition of approval of 
proposed future mining operations.”161 Rather, the approach adopted by 
________ 
note 12, at 8 (“Debits will apply only to impact(s) that will remain after 
implementation of practicable avoidance and minimization measures, as determined 
by BLM.”). 
158.  See Michael Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation for Fossil Fuel 
Extraction on Federal Lands, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 295, 335–36 (2017). 
Regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act establish this 
hierarchy, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20, but it has been imported into other mitigation regimes.  
159.  Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 1 (reciting purpose of 
agreement as allowing for a “Bank to compensate for impacts to the greater sage-
grouse and sagebrush ecosystems with actions that produce a Net Conservation 
Gain”); Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 5 (“The Parties agree to work together 
to . . . pursue measurable net conservation gain(s) for sagebrush species.”). 
160.  Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 11. 
161.  Id. at 4. 
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the Agreement “is intended to define a methodology supported by the best-
available science” to quantify the positive and negative effects Barrick’s 
various activities have on greater sage-grouse. The Newmont Agreement 
includes similar limitations clauses, but also describes the BLM’s 
commitments using less binding language. Rather than committing to 
either the Nevada or the Nature Conservancy methodologies for assessing 
credits and debits, the Agreement provides that if the “BLM determines 
that existing credits are sufficient to achieve a net conservation gain, then 
it is anticipated that the BLM . . . will not require additional compensatory 
mitigation measures for that species and habitat when reviewing a 
proposed plan of operations or amendment.”162 The Agreement does 
further include a procedural commitment under which the BLM agrees to 
evaluate the use of credits generated by Newmont as an alternative in 
applicable NEPA analyses.163 
Eighth, both Agreements include provisions to address the 
potential of a listing of the greater sage-grouse in the future. Both 
Agreements envision the use of credits in the section 7 consultation 
process, although the terms of the Newmont Agreement, specify that 
credits may be used in that context only if FWS deems them to be 
appropriate.164 If credits are used, under both Agreements, the FWS agrees 
that if the agency “determines that . . . credits are sufficient to achieve a 
net conservation gain,” it will require no additional conservation measures 
through the section 7 consultation process.165 Moreover, the Agreements 
provide that the companies may rely on credits to satisfy mitigation 
obligations should they choose to seek incidental take permits under 
section 10.166  
 
________ 
162.  Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 7; Barrick Agreement, 
supra note 11, at 4. 
163.  Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 7. 
164.  Id. at 6. The Barrick Agreement is more unconditional in stating 
the FWS’s obligation to allow the use of credits in section 7 consultations. Barrick 
Agreement, supra note 11, at 22.  
165.  Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 6; Barrick Agreement, 
supra note 11, at 22. 
166.  Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 7; Barrick Agreement, 
supra note 11, at 22. 
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B.  Lessons Learned 
The Barrick and Newmont Agreements are instructive for future 
public-private conservation agreements, even if the Trump Administration 
abandons the greater sage-grouse conservation plans that form the 
predicate upon which the Agreements were based. The context from which 
the Agreements were born also suggests conditions that may be likely to 
foster public-private collaborations of this type. 
Perhaps the most hopeful lesson of these Agreements is that 
collaboration and compromise aimed at achieving both increased 
economic and ecological certainty is possible. In 1995, Secretary of the 
Interior Bruce Babbitt called for “innovation within the terms of the 
ESA,”167 and the Department of the Interior under his leadership took up 
that call and developed tools, such as the “no surprises” policy, and 
candidate conservation agreements.168 The Barrick and Newmont 
Agreements represent a new approach in that same spirit, and they 
underscore that more room for innovation and experimentation exists. 
Federal and state governments and private parties can develop new, 
effective models for conserving species in decline, while blunting 
economic impacts and enhancing regulatory certainty. Public-private 
conservation agreements that enable systemized, mitigation credit banking 
and trading, such as those envisioned by the Barrick and Newmont 
Agreements, and that bring together the FWS, federal land managers, 
states, and private parties are a new frontier in wildlife conservation that 
can secure early, voluntary, and proactive efforts to avoid the need to list 
a species.  
These Agreements also evidence that the threat of a listing, and 
the attendant regulatory uncertainty that such a threat produces, can 
provide fertile ground for collaboration. To many, mining companies may 
seem unlikely allies in the enterprise of species preservation, but 
companies like Barrick and Newmont may welcome the opportunity to 
make early investments in wildlife conservation if those investments 
translate into increased regulatory certainty over the long run. The specter 
of a listing, in other words, can align the profit motive of industry with the 
public goal of avoiding the decline or extinction of species. The regulatory 
________ 
167.  Babbitt, supra note 105, at 366. 
168.  See supra notes 109-114 & accompany text. 
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precipice of a listing decision can, therefore, create positive incentives for 
private actors to engage in wildlife conservation, where such conservation 
efforts can realistically be viewed as avoiding a listing.169 
The Agreements’ provisions addressing the FWS’s commitments, 
should the greater sage-grouse be listed as threatened or endangered, also 
highlight the salutary effects of the net-conservation gain standard, 
articulated in the greater sage-grouse conservation plans and incorporated 
into the Agreements.170 ESA sections 7 and 10 allow the FWS to authorize 
the incidental take of listed species in certain circumstances and both 
provisions require mitigation to minimize the impacts of such take.171 
Because achieving a net-conservation gain for a species would by 
definition meet the requirement that impacts be minimized, the FWS could 
appropriately commit, assuming it found that standard had been achieved, 
to allowing the mining companies to rely on credits to meet potential 
regulatory obligations even following a listing. Moreover, a commitment 
to this standard would also seem to sidestep the requirement under section 
10 that a project applicant minimize and mitigate impacts “to the 
maximum extent practicable,”172 because the project would lead to a net 
benefit for the species. In other words, from the perspective of species 
conservation, adherence to the net-conservation gain standard transforms 
land use decisions that would traditionally be viewed as harming a species, 
into decisions that promote and enhance conservation.173 
________ 
169.  The pro-conservation incentive of a potential listing would not 
exist if private actors do not believe that conservation efforts can realistically avoid a 
listing. Cf. Byrne, supra note _, at 346 (discussing perverse incentives created by the 
bianary nature of listing decisions). 
170.  See 2015 12-month Finding, supra note 69, at 59,881 Barrick 
Agreement, supra note 11, at 1; Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 5. 
171.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii); id. §§ 1539 (a)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(ii).  
172.  See id. § 1539(B)(ii); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 
2d 1274, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (ruling that an HCP provision tied to the biological 
needs of the species did not satisfy the requirement that mitigation occur to the 
maximum extent practicable). 
173.  That a project proponent can demonstrate a net conservation gain 
for a proposed project does not, of course, mean that the project is environmentally 
beneficial across all dimensions. Mining, like other resources uses, may threaten a 
range of environmental values other than species’ health. 
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The Agreements also highlight a complexity likely to emerge in 
negotiations. The BLM has not issued a regulation that specifically 
authorizes agreements of this sort, and as a result the agency has limited 
ability to bind itself in a contract to obligations that will determine the 
outcome of future administrative decisions, such as the approval of a plan 
of operations for mining activities on federal lands. As a result, the 
commitments in both the Barrick Agreement and Newmont Agreement are 
carefully circumscribed, and the BLM retains discretion to evaluate the 
use of credits in the future.174 Such a soft commitment could be a hard pill 
to swallow for a private party negotiating a public-private agreement; the 
company agrees to a framework for undertaking specific, affirmative 
conservation projects, and the federal agencies agree to consider—but not 
automatically accept—credits generated by those projects in future 
decision-making processes. Insisting on firmer, more binding 
commitments on the part of federal agencies is not, however, in any party’s 
interest. An agreement purporting to tie the agencies’ hands in future 
administrative decision-making processes could generate substantial legal 
risk for those future decisions. This is because a project’s opponents could 
argue that the federal agencies had precommitted to an outcome, and that 
precommitment infected the agency’s environmental analysis and ultimate 
decision.175 Both federal agencies, and the private parties with whom they 
negotiate, should pay careful attention to this dynamic and ensure that 
public-private conservation agreements do not inadvertently create new 
sources of legal uncertainty by rendering future agency decisions 
vulnerable to legal challenges. 
At the same time, any private party agreeing to undertake 
voluntary conservation measures will understandably want as much 
assurance as possible that they will reap some benefit from those voluntary 
actions and that federal agencies will incorporate them into future 
________ 
174.  See Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 7; Barrick Agreement, 
supra note 11, at 4. 
175.  See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(requiring compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act at the “point of 
commitment”). Cf. Morgan v. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936) (“The one who decides 
must hear.”); Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1111 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[A]s failure to provide notice-and-comment rulemaking will 
usually mean that affected parties have had no prior formal opportunity to present their 
contentions, judicial review for want of reasoned decisionmaking is likely, in effect, 
to take place in review of specific agency actions implementing the rule.”).  
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decision-making processes. In my view, the Newmont Agreement took the 
better course in striking this balance. The Agreement states that if 
Newmont proffers credits as mitigation for its mining activities, “it is 
anticipated that the BLM, to the extent consistent with applicable law and 
regulations, will not require additional compensatory mitigation 
measures.”176 The BLM also commits to considering the use of credits as 
an alternative in any required NEPA analysis, a procedural commitment 
that does not create the same degree of legal vulnerability for subsequent 
decisions of a substantive commitment.177 The Barrick Agreement 
includes a general disclaimer that it does not limit the agency’s discretion, 
and therefore, also likely insulates future decisions relying on credits 
generated under it, but it is less precise.178  
In my judgment, there were two necessary ingredients that 
enabled these Agreements to be successfully negotiated, and as result, 
additional innovation may be necessary to negotiate public-private 
conservation agreements in other contexts. First, Barrick and Newmont 
engage in long-term projects on public lands that require significant and 
prolonged investments on the part of the companies. Constructing, 
operating, and reclaiming a mine takes decades. The cost of regulatory 
uncertainty in such a context exceeds the potential economic gains the 
companies would be likely to achieve from looser standards in the short 
term. These two companies were willing to agree to increased 
conservation obligations if they could secure increased regulatory 
certainty and stability. This certainty takes two forms. First, the companies 
wanted to enter agreements that will enable them to better predict their 
obligations under the applicable land use plans governing the public lands 
in which they operate both today and in the future. Second, the companies 
wanted to avoid deterioration of the greater sage-grouse population and 
the risk that the FWS will reconsider its decision that a listing was not 
warranted and list the bird as threatened or endangered, and as much as 
possible create predictable obligations should a listing occur. Resource 
________ 
176.  Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 7. 
177.  Cf. McVean & Pidot, supra note 126, at 233-238 (explaining that 
settlements through which the United States commits to procedural obligations are 
more consistent with administrative law than those involving substantive 
commitments). 
178.  See Barrick Agreement, supra note 11, at 4. 
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users who engage in short-duration, less capital-intensive activities, or 
who are not repeat players on public lands, may have less incentive to trade 
higher up-front costs for increased long-term regulatory predictability. 
A second ingredient that enabled these Agreements was the 
breadth of activities and interests of the private parties. Newmont and 
Barrick engage in a number of uses of public lands, including mining and 
grazing, and have private land holdings as well. The variety and quantity 
of these interests laid the groundwork for the companies to engage in 
voluntary conservation measures with respect to a portion of their portfolio 
that would accrue significant benefits to the greater sage-grouse and more 
than offset impacts from the companies’ mining operations. Scaling these 
Agreements to smaller companies with fewer property and business 
interests may present different challenges. That said, the Agreements do 
identify a potential avenue for similar efforts with smaller private partners, 
because they contemplate the companies enhancing habitat on public 
lands, with the appropriate regulatory permissions, an approach that could 
work for other resource users who lack opportunities for purely private 
conservation projects. Moreover, that the Newmont Agreement 
contemplates sale or transfer of conservation credits could provide an 
avenue for smaller companies to both participate in and profit from similar 
agreements.179 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE 
The Obama Administration undertook an unprecedented effort to 
create a federal conservation strategy for the greater sage-grouse sufficient 
to stave off a listing of the species under the ESA and enabling it to enter 
into agreements with states and private parties to increase certainty about 
the obligations those plans would impose on economic actors. As the 
Trump Administration took office, I hoped that these efforts would 
translate into conservation durability. After all, rolling back the greater 
sage-grouse plans would eliminate the basis for the FWS’s not warranted 
finding, and the increased likelihood of a future listing would create 
substantial economic uncertainty. So far, it appears I was overly 
optimistic, although the plans themselves have not yet formally been 
abandoned. 
________ 
179.  See Newmont Agreement, supra note 12, at 8. 
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The unravelling of the greater sage-grouse conservation plans 
began when President Trump issued an Executive Order on March 28, 
2017, directing a review of all policies “that potentially burden the 
development or use of domestically produced energy resources, with 
particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy 
resources.”180 Purporting to implement that Executive Order, and 
notwithstanding the fact that the greater sage-grouse conservation plans 
significantly enhance long-term certainty and predictability for companies 
seeking to develop energy resources on federal lands, Secretary Ryan 
Zinke signed a Secretarial Order on June 7, 2017, requiring a 
comprehensive review of the greater sage-grouse conservation plans.181 In 
October, the Department published a notice of intent to consider amending 
all of the BLM land use plans implementing the greater sage-grouse 
conservation plans,182 and the BLM cancelled the proposed withdrawal of 
10 million acres of key sage-grouse habitat.183  
________ 
180.  Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. 
Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
181.  Greater Sage-Grouse Conservation and Cooperation with Western 
States, Secretarial Order 3353 (June 7, 2017), available at 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/ files/uploads/so_3353.pdf. The order also directs 
the department to “develop . . . memorandums of understanding and other agreements 
with states and other partners regarding implementation of the 2015 Sage-Grouse 
Plans,” an approach that was already well-underway.  
182.  Notice of Intent to Amend Land Use Plans Regarding Greater 
Sage-Grouse Conservation and Prepare Associated Environmental Impact Statements 
or Environmental Assessments, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,248 (Oct. 11, 2017); corrected by 82 
Fed. Reg. 50,666 (Nov. 1, 2017).  The Notice of Intent justifies reconsideration, in 
part, on a Nevada district court ruling that the Dep’t of the Interior should have 
prepared a supplemental environmental impact statement prior to amending a resource 
management plan in Nevada and Northeastern California, W. Exploration, LLC v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 250 F. Supp. 3d 718 (D. Nev. 2017), but the notice extends 
reconsideration to the substance of all of the land use plan amendments, rather than 
limiting itself to compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act for one of 
them.  82 Fed. Reg. at 47,248. 
183.  Notice of Cancellation of Withdrawal Application and Withdrawal 
Proposal and Notice of Termination of Environmental Impact Statement for the 
Sagebrush Focal Area Withdrawal in Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and 
Wyoming, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,248 (Oct. 11, 2017). 
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Some resources user groups have supported these steps,184 but 
many have expressed hesitation. The republican governors of Wyoming 
and Nevada have both objected to major revisions to the plans.185 
Wyoming Governor Matt Meade specifically described his concerns in the 
language of economic and ecological certainty. When the Department of 
the Interior initiated its review of the plans, he explained, “Mineral 
companies need long-term predictability as they decide where to put 
capital. On top of that the bird needs a long-term plan.”186 
On November 30, 2017, a diverse coalition of Wyoming groups, 
representing the oil and gas, mining, ranching, farming, business, and 
environmental interests, joined the fray and sent a letter to the Department 
of the Interior opposing fundamental shifts in greater sage-grouse 
conservation and “recommend[ing] that BLM look for opportunities to 
make any revisions deemed necessary through means other than the full 
RMP amendment process, wherever possible, including through 
Instructional memoranda policy clarification.”187 A bipartisan group of 
former officials in federal and state wildlife agencies also sent a letter to 
Secretary Zinke expressing “hope [that] you will maintain this 
________ 
184.  See Letter from Western Energy Alliance to Greater Sage Grouse 
Review Team (July 19, 2017)  available at https://cdn.westernenergyalliance.org/ 
sites/default/files/Western%20Energy%20Alliance%20Letter%20to%20Interior%20
re%20GrSG%20Economic%20Impact.pdf. 
185.  See Dan Elliott, Colorado’s Hickenlooper, Wyoming governor 
warn Trump against big changes in sage grouse plan, DENVER POST (Oct. 31, 2017) 
available at http://www.denverpost.com/2017/10/31/donald-trump-john-
hickenlooper-warns-against-greater-sage-grouse-plan-changes/; Scott Streater, Sage 
Grouse: 2nd Republic governor questions Zinke plan revisions, E&E NEWS PM (Aug. 
23, 2017) https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060059125.  
186.  Heather Richards, Wyoming governor concerned by anticipated 
sage grouse changes, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE (Oct. 2, 2017) available at 
http://trib.com/business/energy/wyoming-governor-concerned-by-anticipated-sage-
grouse-changes/article_794ed2b4-1414-5ca3-a207-bb32fd5241f7.html.  
187.  Letter from Paul Ulrich, et al., to Erica Husse, E&E NEWS PM, 
(Nov. 30, 2017)  available at https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/12/01/document 
_gw_03.pdf; see Scot Streaer, Sage Grouse: Wyo. industry, conservation groups see 
hop in federal plans, E&E NEWS PM (Dec. 1, 2017) available at https://www. 
eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060067863.  
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extraordinary conservation effort with minor adjustments as deemed 
necessary and based on science.”188  
It remains to be seen what changes the Trump Administration 
ultimately makes to the Obama Administration’s greater sage-grouse 
conservation plans. Litigation will surely ensue, whatever the outcome, 
and if wholesale changes occur, both the bird and economic actors across 
sagebrush country will face significant new uncertainty. Regardless, the 
Obama Administration’s efforts, including the public-private conservation 
agreements entered between the Department of the Interior and two 
mining companies, may provide a blue print for future wildlife 
conservation efforts designed to forestall the listing of a declining species, 
and secure additional predictability for economic actors. 
________ 
188.  Letter from William A. Molini, et al., to Secretary Ryan Zinke 
(Nov. 17, 2017), available at http://www.trcp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ 
Wildlife-Professional-letter-on-Fed-Sage-grouse-Plan-Amendments-11-30-2017.pdf. 
